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Executive Summary
Funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council under the UKRI COVID-19 Rapid Response call, the 
Observatory for Monitoring Data-Driven Approaches to COVID-19 (OMDDAC) is a collaboration between 
Northumbria University and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). This project has involved a multi-
disciplinary team of researchers (with expertise in the law on technology, data protection, and medicine 
as well as practical ethics, computer science, data science, applied statistics in health, technology 
and security studies and behavioural science) to investigate the legal, ethical, policy and operational 
challenges encountered in relation to key data-driven responses to the pandemic.
The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the consideration of several priorities in the data and technology 
space, which are reflected in the UK Government’s present strategies. The National Data Strategy, in 
particular, pledges to take account of the lessons learned from the COVID-19 response and draw upon 
the UK’s values of transparency, accountability and inclusion.1
Seeking to inform the lessons learned from the pandemic, the project used a mixed-methods research 
design that included case study analysis, interviews with key stakeholders (individuals with relevant 
expertise and/or experience in relation to the data-driven pandemic response), representative public 
surveys, and engagement with young people through a children’s rights charity. OMDDAC has published 
four snapshot reports focused on data-driven public policy, tech-driven approaches to public health, 
policing and public safety and key findings from the public perceptions survey. The emerging issues 
identified in those reports align closely with the four pillars of the National Data Strategy, which form the 
framework for this final project report: 
 1.   Data Foundations (data quality issues and infrastructure); 
 2.   Data Skills (data literacy of decision-makers); 
 3.   Data Availability (data sharing); and 
 4.   Responsibility (law, ethics, transparency, and public trust).  
Data Foundations: in our interviews, stakeholders consistently highlighted significant challenges 
relating to data quality and operational capability. We found that a “thirst for information” across policing 
and government during the pandemic led to the creation of new data sets with varying levels of data 
reliability. Interviewees also talked of a wide diversity in technical and operational capability across 
the public sector. These findings echo those of the National Data Strategy which identifies obstacles to 
the effective sharing and use of data arising from inconsistencies in standards and data infrastructure 
across government. We therefore recommend: 
 
• the establishment of a national public sector data standards framework to address    
 inconsistencies and enable better interoperability of public sector data; 
• that corrective action be taken to address quality issues with data across the public sector; 
• the collection and incorporation of qualitative data in support of quantitative data, for    
 informing sound decision-making; 
• that where AI and automated decision-making tools are employed to feed into decisions   
 affecting individuals, they should continue to be subject to meaningful human oversight   
 mechanisms;2 and
• that there is consultation across the public sector to determine the ICT infrastructure and   
 resource requirement to facilitate appropriate and secure data sharing and analysis.
5
Data Skills: the pandemic exposed important skill gaps related to data-driven approaches. In 
particular, our findings identified a gap in the data literacy capabilities of government leaders and 
decision-makers at a central and local level. Concerns were expressed about a ‘breakdown at the 
interface between analysing data and deciding what to do with it’, calling into question whether decision-
makers are properly equipped to evaluate and utilise data-driven outputs, taking into account 
relevant limitations, assumptions and uncertainties. We recommend that:
• decision-makers and policy-makers in the public sector be required to undertake data literacy   
 training and development; and
• there is more active encouragement of interdisciplinary collaboration between specialists in the  
 methodology (including epidemiologists, data scientists and mathematicians) and domain   
 specialists (including behavioural scientists as well as, critically, law and governance specialists). 
Data Availability: the pandemic saw unprecedented levels of medical- and non-medical data  
sharing as well as innovative ways of doing so.  The sharing, linkage, and repurposing of datasets 
from a diverse range of sources has been a central tenet of the national pandemic response. 
OMDDAC’s research showed that the sharing of sensitive health data with bodies like the police, for 
example, has evoked some public concern. It is therefore crucial that data acquisition, sharing and 
processing is guided by robust information governance requirements that are transparent to the 
public and that any restrictions and limitations are clearly laid out in law. It is evident that there is 
work to be done, especially as our research indicated that data sharing between certain organisations 
is likely to be of concern to the public. To create an environment where data sharing and analysis is 
trusted and accepted by the public, we recommend that:
• data acquisition, sharing and processing is subject to robust, ‘end-to-end’ information    
 governance requirements that are made transparent to the public, with clear restrictions and   
 limitations set out in law and regulation;
• the design of data-sharing initiatives aims to maximise public acceptability by: 
• being transparent about what data is being shared and with whom; 
• avoiding assumptions about whether the public is comfortable with their data being   
 shared across all sections of the public sector; 
• avoiding a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to data sharing; and
• providing options for how much detail is shared.
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Responsibility: Our research identified two key issues which are vital for the responsible use of 
data: transparency and public engagement. Stakeholders highlighted a need for greater transparency 
firstly with regard to the fundamental capabilities of data to ensure that the outcomes of statistical 
modelling are not presented, or perceived as, ‘the truth’. In addition, our research highlights a need 
for greater levels of transparency and public engagement with regard to the ways in which data is used. 
It is evident that there exist real public concerns around specific types of data sharing that need to be 
addressed directly and we encourage a new public conversation post pandemic to ensure that the 
public are better informed, educated and consulted regarding the use of their data. The views of young 
people – who have been described as ‘the hidden victims of COVID-19’3 – must also be incorporated into 
this conversation. The young people who participated in our research felt that their views had not 
been considered enough during the pandemic and suggested several ways in which the Government 
could do more to inform and engage more effectively with this vital section of the population. We 
recommend that:
• future policy decisions informed by data modelling are accompanied by explanatory statements,  
 which are published in a format accessible to the public and detail the relevant limitations,   
 assumptions and uncertainties. The form and content of the explanatory statements should be   
     decided in consultation with multiple sections of the public, including children and young people;
• the public should be informed in a transparent and accessible manner about which    
 organisations have access to their data;
• where Memoranda of Understanding are agreed between enforcement bodies and health   
 agencies for the sharing of sensitive health data, the terms and conditions must be made as   
 transparent to the public as possible;
• the Government Office for Science should initiate a new public conversation to consult with,   
 inform and educate the public regarding the use of data; and
• public consultations must be inclusive of all members of the public, including under-represented  
 groups and children and young people, employing multiple strategies of engagement.
The findings of the OMDDAC project highlight the central importance of data quality and 
integrity, robust information governance mechanisms and public transparency for creating an 
environment where data analysis and sharing can be trusted and accepted in an emergency 
context. We therefore recommend, in conclusion, that these obligations are reinforced by a regulatory 
oversight mechanism whereby an appropriate oversight body is appointed during emergency 
situations to ensure that: 
• use and sharing of data by central government and public bodies for operational and public   
 policy purposes serve the public good; 
• data use and sharing are supported by appropriate public transparency about data sources and  
 methods of analysis; 
• data analysis is conducted with quality and integrity; and 
• data sharing is overseen by independent governance and is subject to appropriate controls,   
 conditions and time-limitations.
3 Barnardo’s (2021) ‘Supporting the hidden victims of Covid-19: Lessons from the First Wave.
https://www.barnardos.org.uk/research/supporting-hidden-victims-covid-19-lessons-first-wave accessed 16 September 2021.
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4 UK National Data Strategy (n 1).
5 Being individuals with relevant expertise and/or experience in relation to the data-driven pandemic response. Participant stakeholders were 
drawn from a wide range of relevant sectors, backgrounds and disciplines, including: the private sector; government; academia; police and law 
enforcement; organisations specialising in the use, management and protection of data; the medical profession; charities and the third sector; 
regulators and the legal profession. See Appendix I.
Introduction
Research Rationale
Northumbria University and the Royal United Services Institute were funded by the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council to conduct a research project entitled ‘The Observatory for Monitoring Data-Driven 
Approaches to COVID-19’ (OMDDAC). This report is the culmination of a year’s research, comprising: i) 
interviews focused on the experiences of key stakeholders regarding pandemic data-driven policymaking, 
technology and public health, and policing and public safety; ii) original quantitative research in the 
form of public surveys; and iii) engagement with children and young people, being one of the under-
represented voices in the public debate on data and COVID-19. The aim of the project was to establish a 
mechanism for monitoring the key developments in data-driven approaches to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
shining a light on some of the most important legal, ethical, regulatory, and policy challenges that 
have arisen in this period. We present the lessons learned during this period in this report to inform 
policymakers’ responses to similar challenges in future. 
The pandemic has accelerated the consideration of a number of priorities in the data and technology 
space, and these are being reflected in the present strategies of the UK Government. In particular, the 
National Data Strategy pledges to take account of the lessons learned from the COVID-19 response 
and draw upon the UK’s values of transparency, accountability and inclusion.4  This is imperative as the 
pandemic has fundamentally elevated the perceptions of those working with data every day of what 
can be achieved when there is increased urgency and lower barriers to sharing and engagement. The 
public debate on COVID-19 and data can be expected to pivot away from identifying the key data-driven 
responses to the pandemic, towards identifying the outcomes and technical developments which 
society would be better served keeping; the ones it should discard; and the ones which require further 
negotiation. OMDDAC findings are well-placed to inform this crucial phase, by combining insights from 
key literature, the views of a representative sample of the public, the experiences of key stakeholders 
and the voices of children and young people. 
Methodology
OMDDAC is a collaborative and integrated interdisciplinary project.  It includes researchers with 
expertise in law, governance, ethics, data and computer science, human-computer interaction, 
statistics, technology, and surveillance studies. It has adopted an innovative mixed-methods research 
design, incorporating case study analysis, stakeholder interviews,5 representative public surveys, and 
engagement with young people through a children’s rights charity. Its outputs, including this project 
report, aim to apply project research findings to addressing policy and operational issues. For further 
details regarding our methodology, please refer to Appendix I.
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Report Structure
This report brings the strands of OMDDAC’s research together, combining and presenting the novel 
findings and recommendations from each method employed. In doing so, four key themes have been 
identified as underpinning our findings, which mirror the four pillars of the UK Government’s National 
Data Strategy.6  The following four pillars, which will shape the future of data strategy in the coming 







During the landscape mapping assessment initially undertaken by OMDDAC,7  we identified that data-
driven approaches to COVID-19 appeared to be understood by interviewees as existing ‘on a spectrum 
between entirely automated, AI-powered processing and the more “mundane” uses of digital information 
and statistics’ which feed into human decision-making.8  Applying this broad understanding of ‘data-
driven’, the research team examined a range of areas where data use and public policy intersect to gain 
an understanding of how the public health crisis has prompted data-driven decision making: 
• Data-driven public policy
• Tech-driven approaches to public health
• Policing and public safety
• Data in decision-making for children
• Public health surveillance of wastewater
• Public willingness to share data
6 UK National Data Strategy (n 1).
7 See Appendix I.
8 OMDDAC, ‘Mapping the Data-Driven Landscape’ (2021) https://www.omddac.org.uk/news/mapping-the-data-drivenlandscape/
accessed 16 September 2021. In the context of our research, we limit AI to the use of data analytics and machinelearning algorithms.
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1. Data Foundations
Interviewees consistently highlighted challenges relating to data quality and operational capability as 
hindering more effective data-driven responses to COVID-19.  The importance of this issue is reflected in 
the first core pillar of the UK Government’s National Data Strategy: Data Foundations. According to the 
Strategy: 
‘The true value of data can only be fully realised when it is fit for purpose, recorded in 
standardised formats on modern, future-proof systems and held in a condition that means it is 
findable, accessible, interoperable and reusable. By improving the quality of the data, we can 
use it more effectively, and drive better insights and outcomes from its use’.9
The National Data Strategy identifies obstacles to the effective sharing and use of data arising from 
the lack of consistency in the standards and data infrastructure used across the public sector. Our 
recommendations reflect these findings and address the associated challenges.
1.1 Data Quality
Stakeholders across the public sector consistently reported issues regarding data quality, referencing 
errors, omissions and out of date information.  One of the central concerns of local authority stakeholders 
arising from this issue was that vulnerable residents who required support would be missed as a result, 
with data being received in incomplete (and as described by one stakeholder ‘chaotic’) forms:10
‘We had examples where data received from NHS of persons who were on the shield list, where 
the address data was so bad that we only got a postcode. So, because this person may be 
in their house and not allowed or not able to leave, and maybe had no recourse to getting 
food or whatever, especially during the first lockdown, they were literally sending out people 
with nothing more than a postcode, trying to ask neighbours if they knew of this person to 
track them down (...) One high rise block of flats has one postcode so it could be hundreds of 
dwellings in some places. The importance of accurate addressing became really clear’.11
Issues with data interoperability were also experienced, arising from inconsistencies with the data 
ontology and labelling used across different public sector organisations. As one interviewee explained: 
‘once you’ve agreed to share the data, bringing it together requires lots more engineering and 
familiarisation with the data than would be necessary if we had widespread data standards... Investment 
in our data assets is a big [challenge]. It is a little technical and boring, but if we’ve got good quality data 
that is well described and that has content standards around it, we can really accelerate the pace at 
which we can bring them together’.12
9  UK National Data Strategy (n 1).
10 Interview with government stakeholders (G12 and G13).
11 Interview with government stakeholders (G12 and G13).
12 Interview with government stakeholder (G17).
13 HMICFRS, ‘Policing in the pandemic - The police response to the coronavirus pandemic during 2020’, April 20 2021, p.16.
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From the perspective of policing, data acquisition and data quality were two of the main challenges faced 
in monitoring resourcing and staff wellbeing during the pandemic. A report released by Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) found that the IT systems in 
some police forces were detrimental to their understanding of demand for their services and how much 
resource they would need to commit to meet that demand. If the platforms for storing important data 
are themselves sub-standard, data interoperability within a force and across other forces is undermined, 
and detecting any missing data is made harder. 14
OMDDAC research found that this had consequences for data-driven decision-making, highlighting the 
need for additional work to firstly identify uncertainty and incompleteness within the data and secondly to 
improve its quality.  In the public health context, for example, the deployment of risk-scoring algorithms 
such as QCovid15 has emphasised the importance of raw data quality in the process of developing, testing, 
and validating an effective algorithm. One stakeholder highlighted that a key challenge presented by the 
QCovid algorithm, or indeed any algorithmically-informed decision-making tool, is the use of outdated 
or unreliable health data to inform risk stratification, emphasising the importance of steps to improve 
the quality of raw data:
‘To train a good machine learning algorithm you need lots of data and so we have places 
within the health system that will naturally have large quantities of data, but that doesn’t 
necessarily mean it is clean data or well labelled data. And then when you use that data to 
train, you inherit both its clinical utility and the faults.’ 16
Data quality is therefore essential in developing an algorithm that can be ethically and reliably used to 
inform clinical or policy decisions. Interviewees highlighted that where the quality and reliability of data 
is low, the robustness of automated, algorithmic decision-making is called into question, not least given 
the risk of ‘spurious correlations’ being formed.17 This underscores the continued importance of human 
oversight in the application of automated tools and AI which impact upon decisions affecting individuals; 
a feature which is particularly relevant in the context of the data protection reforms currently being 
proposed by the UK Government. 18
Stakeholders additionally pointed out that there are a number of fundamental limitations inherent 
in the process of working with quantitative data, which must be taken into account and addressed 
transparently. As one stakeholder emphasised: 
‘some things we are observing during the pandemic cannot be mathematically reduced into 
facts and requires some form of interpretation, coupled with local knowledge’.19 
14 Relatedly, the National Law Enforcement Data Programme (NLEDS), a programme launched in 2016 to replace two police IT systems, has come 
under criticism by the National Audit Office due to delays which are, according to the NAO, putting police access to vital information at risk. The two 
systems (the Police National Computer and the Police National Database) are considered part of the critical infrastructure; however, their techno-
logy is becoming obsolete. The NLEDS programme, which had an original planned delivery date of 2020, was subject to independent review which 
found that if it was to continue as it was, it would be late, difficult and costly to roll out and maintain, and would not meet the needs of the police. 
National Audit Office, The National Law Enforcement Data Programme (HC 663 2021-22) https://www.nao.org.uk/wpcontent/ uploads/2021/09/
The-National-Law-Enforcement-Data-Programme.pdf accessed 17 September 2021.
15 See https://www.qcovid.org/ accessed 16 September 2021.
16 Interview with data specialist stakeholder (D12).
17 Interview with data specialist stakeholder (D9).
18 The UK Government is seeking views on a proposal to remove Article 22 of the UK GDPR, with solely automated decisionmaking
being permitted where it meets a lawful ground. DCMS, ‘Data: a new direction’ (10 September 2021) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/gover-
nment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1022315/Data_Reform_Consultation_Document__Accessible_.pdf 1 October 2021.
19 Interview with regulatory stakeholder (R1).
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Several stakeholders have addressed this contextual gap by supplementing their quantitative, 
administrative data with local knowledge and input, as well as qualitative research in the form of 
interviews and surveys. Local knowledge, in particular, proved to be a crucial element in informing 
appropriately targeted pandemic responses within the community.
Recommendations: 
•  As part of the National Data Strategy, a national public sector data standards 
framework should be introduced and implemented. This should incorporate clearly 
defined and consistent formatting, with labels and ontology being implemented across 
health and non-health authorities to enable interoperability. A rigorous ‘lessons learned’ 
exercise across authorities to inform such a framework will ensure best practice can be 
synthesised and deployed.
•  The National Data Strategy should also require that investment, resource, and 
corrective action be directed to formally address data quality issues across the public 
sector. Getting the basics of data quality right must be a primary consideration before 
engaging in more sophisticated data analysis. Errors, omissions and outdated information 
should be highlighted for rectification. Collecting, cleaning, and harmonising data are 
important steps in the data ‘lifecycle’ which must be provided with sufficient time and 
resource.
• Qualitative data should be formally collected and used in support of quantitative 
data to inform decision-making. Quantitative datasets should be contextualised with 
qualitative findings from, for example, local knowledge or interview data.
•  Human oversight mechanisms should continue to play a central role in relation to 
the application of automated decision-making tools which feed into decisions affecting 
individuals. This should consider whether the application of automated decision-making is 
appropriate given the particular context, taking into account the quality of the data available. 
Further, there is a primary need for human involvement to ensure data quality given the 
direct impact upon the robustness of outputs from automated methods of data analysis and 
decision-making.
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20 Interview with law enforcement stakeholder (L11).
1.2 Data Infrastructure
In terms of data infrastructure, stakeholders highlighted a huge diversity in technical and operational 
capability.  Interviewees in local government, for instance, told us that while some authorities were 
able to operate using ‘more sophisticated’ systems, others relied heavily on software such as Microsoft 
Excel for data processing, limiting the opportunities for more advanced data analytics. The process for 
requesting and obtaining data from central government was also consistently described in onerous 
terms, requiring a significant element of manual processing on a daily basis. In addition, interviewees 
expressed concerns around data being shared through non-secure channels.
Similarly, data infrastructure posed various problems for a more coordinated data-driven response 
to the pandemic in the context of policing. One interviewee shared: ‘There are at least 40 different 
approaches to tech and digital capability – different recording platforms even across different areas in 
a single force. That’s why we have ended up using Excel’.20 It was emphasised that the majority of data-
driven responses did not involve very technically advanced analytics or machine learning. This raises two 
significant points: firstly, that valuable insights can be derived using already established data analysis 
techniques; and secondly, that greater consistency in data infrastructures would enable interoperability 
and could allow organisations to take advantage of more advanced tools, producing better outcomes 
across all forces. 
Recommendation: 
•  There should be significant consultation across the public sector, as part of the 
National Data Strategy to determine ICT infrastructure and resource requirements in 
order to facilitate appropriate and secure data sharing and analysis.  All public sector 
bodies should be involved in such a consultation, to improve levels of consistency in the data 
infrastructures used and enable more consistent methods of analysis and secure sharing of 
data. 
13
21 UK National Data Strategy (n 1).
22 Interview with academic stakeholder (A3).
23 By statistical modelling, we refer here to data modelling as a probabilistic exercise focused on forecasting and predicting future outcomes.
24 Interview with government stakeholder (G3).
25 Interview with government stakeholders (G9 and G10).
2. Data Skills
Stakeholders told us that the pandemic has exposed several important skills gaps with regard to data-
driven approaches, a theme which is reflected in the second core pillar of the National Data Strategy 
– Data Skills: 
‘To make the best use of data, we must have a wealth of data skills to draw on. That means 
delivering the right skills through our education system, but also ensuring that people can 
continue to develop the data skills they need throughout their lives... To address this objective 
we will need to drive change across... capability, leadership and culture: developing world-
leading capability in data and data science across central and local government, so that 
leaders understand its role, expert resource is widely available, staff at all levels have the skills 
they need, and a ‘data-sharing by default’ approach across government tackles the culture of 
risk aversion around data use and sharing’.21
In particular, our findings identified an urgent skills gap in relation to the data literacy capabilities of 
public sector leaders and decision-makers at a central and local level, which needs to be addressed given 
the importance of data for informed decision-making. Our recommendations set out to highlight and 
address these issues.
2.1 Data Literacy
Stakeholders identified a ‘breakdown at the interface between analysing data and deciding what to do 
with it’.22 In particular, interviewees referred to the inherent complexities of statistical modelling, and 
questioned whether policy- and decision-makers were properly equipped to make use of modelling 
outputs, leading to public concerns of the Government ‘hiding behind white coats for tough decision-
making’.24 As explored further in section 4.1 below, interviewees highlighted the importance of ensuring 
that modelling outputs were not presented, or perceived as, ‘the truth’; decision-makers must have 
a thorough understanding of the limitations, uncertainties and assumptions involved to be able to 
meaningfully interpret, evaluate and interrogate statistical outputs. In addition to the provision of 
training, therefore, meaningful, interdisciplinary collaboration between policy makers and specialists 
within a relevant domain was regarded by interviewees as crucial to ’bridge the gap’25 in understanding. 
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26 Interview with government stakeholder (G11).
27 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy; Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, and Office for Artificial Intelligence (2021) 
‘National AI Strategy’ https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-aistrategy/national-ai-strategy-html-version 
accessed 24 September 2021. 
28 Ibid.
29 Such as that proposed by the Royal Statistical Society: https://rss.org.uk/news-publication/newspublications/
2020/general-news/professional-standards-to-be-set-for-data-science/ accessed 16 September 2021.
30 Interview with data specialist stakeholder (D4).
31 Interview with law enforcement stakeholder (L10).
32 Interview with law enforcement stakeholder (L9).
33 Interview with law enforcement stakeholder (L12).
This data literacy skills gap, particularly at a leadership level, was also highlighted as a potential barrier 
to future progress regarding more innovative uses of data. As one stakeholder observed, ’our strategic 
director... understands the strategic need to make use of it, [but] is not very confident when he talks 
on the subject and that comes through’.26 With regard to more advanced data science capabilities, the 
development of a ’larger workforce with AI expertise’ forms part of the recently published National AI 
Strategy,27 which acknowledges that there is a need for ’non-technical’ employees to understand the 
’opportunities, limitations and ethics of using AI’.28 The establishment and incorporation of a professional 
framework for data science, including chartered status,29 was also encouraged by interviewees as one 
approach to addressing the ‘challenge, particularly in the public sector, that leadership doesn’t have the 
expertise’ in addition to the ‘lack of a framework for what they are looking for in terms of skills’ when 
hiring.30 
Relatedly, one of the biggest challenges for policing in relation to skills has been data interpretation. 
One stakeholder commented that ‘sometimes I don’t think we understand what’s in front of us… support 
to interpret the data is not always available’.31 This is a particularly pressing concern given the vast 
quantities of data that police forces have been expected to sift through and derive meaning from – if 
there is an inability to turn ‘data’ into ‘information’ then the value of collecting and sharing large amounts 
of data is brought into question. 
In some instances, OMDDAC research found that these gaps were filled by dedicated advisory groups. For 
example, academics were embedded into Police Scotland’s OpTICAL group to lead data analysis, check 
that powers were being used equitably and ensure that certain social groups or demographics were not 
being disproportionately impacted.32 One interviewee explained that the utility of this approach came 
from having dialogues with informed individuals who are not in police uniform and who can provide a 
realistic perspective on particular matters from outside the policing environment. 33 This creates a setting 
for constructive challenge which is not just beneficial for the police’s skills, but for the academics who 
gain a better understanding of the context of police work during a public health emergency. 
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Recommendations: 
• Decision-makers and policymakers in the public sector should be required to 
undertake data literacy training. Training should enable decision-makers to interpret, 
evaluate and interrogate statistical outputs and understand the associated risks and 
limitations. Professional standards for data science within the public sector should also be 
adopted to assist in this regard. 
• Meaningful multi-disciplinary collaboration should be actively encouraged. 
Increased multi-disciplinary interaction is necessary to bridge the gap between statistical 
modelling and societal reality. More formal mechanisms are needed to allow specialists 
in the methodology (including epidemiologists, data scientists and mathematicians) to 
collaborate with domain specialists (including behavioural scientists as well as, critically, law 
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3. Data Availability
The sharing, linkage and repurposing of data sets from a diverse range of sources has been central to 
the national pandemic response. The third core pillar of the National Strategy - Data Availability - makes 
clear that this is a feature the Government intends to build upon:
‘For data to have the most effective impact, it needs to be appropriately accessible, mobile 
and re-usable. That means encouraging better coordination, access to and sharing of data of 
appropriate quality between organisations in the public, private and third sectors’. 34
Our recommendations stress the continued importance of robust and visible information governance. 
Where necessary, the Government should be prepared to introduce statutory, legally enforceable 
limitations on itself and other public sector bodies which restrict how data is processed and shared in 
certain circumstances, to maintain an environment where data sharing and analysis is accepted and 
trusted by the public.
3.1 Data Sharing During the Pandemic
Existing and novel datasets have been combined in unprecedented, ‘innovative’ ways to better understand 
the prevalence of, and therefore respond to, COVID-19.35  The types of data being shared include medical 
datasets as well as non-medical datasets such as mobility data.36 Moreover, these datasets are acquired 
from both public and private sector sources (such as Google, retail, telecoms and social media companies). 
Wastewater, for example, is one particularly novel data source which has been analysed 
to detect and quantify viral load in order to inform national and local pandemic 
responses.37 The ability to identify traces of COVID-19 through data which is generally 
non-identifiable has been used to help provide an early warning system for new cases in 
a certain geographical area: ’The intriguing thing about wastewater is that it knows no 
statistical boundaries – the wastewater system reflects the way people actually live’.38  
Our research explored the perceptions of the general public, as well as younger members 
of the population, towards the sharing of wastewater data with different organisations, 
including local authorities, public health bodies, the police and a fictional commercial 
company. Our findings are presented in sections 3 and 4 of this report.
34 UK National Data Strategy (n 1).
35 See OMDDAC’s Snapshot Reports for further in-depth analysis of data-driven responses to the pandemic: Rachel Allsopp and others, ‘Snapshot 
Report 1: Data-Driven Public Policy’ (2021) ‘https://www.omddac.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/OMDDAC-Snapshot-Report-1-Public-Policy.
pdf; Sneha Dawda and others, ‘Snapshot Report 2: Tech-Driven Approaches to Public Health’ (2021) https://www.omddac.org.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2021/05/OMDDACSnapshot-Report-2-Tech-Driven-Approaches-to-Public-Health.pdf and Ardi Janjeva and others, ‘Snapshot Report 3: 
Policingand Public Safety (2021) https://www.omddac.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/OMDDAC-Snapshot-Report-3-Policingand-
Public-Safety.pdf accessed 16 September 2021.
36 For example: telecoms, transport, and geo-location data. Other non-health data sources include employee and school absence data.
37 Defra, ‘Tracking Covid-19 in wastewater’ (2021) https://deframedia.blog.gov.uk/2021/04/26/tracking-covid-19-inwastewater/ ; and Linda Ged-
des, ‘We’re the Poo Crew: Sleuths Test for Covid by Reading Signs in Sewage’ The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/24/were-the-poo-crew-sleuths-test-for-covid-by-reading-signs-in-sewage (24 April 2021) both 
accessed 16 September 2021.
38 Interview with government stakeholders (G9 and G10).
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39 Interview with government stakeholders (G9 and G10).
40 Interview with law enforcement stakeholder (L8).
41 All aspects of the OMDDAC study design were reviewed and approved by the ethical review process at Northumbria University.
42 See Appendix I for further detail.
Within government, at both a central and local level, the increase in data sharing has assisted in numerous 
areas, including: supporting vulnerable residents within the community, predictive pandemic modelling 
and, more generally, informing public policy and pandemic-related responses. As one stakeholder 
shared:
‘We’ve learned the importance of mobility data for helping with the pandemic response all the 
way across the board from modelling ‘R’, to understanding how to design lockdowns, what the 
parameters of those lockdowns are, the geographical areas for those locales… There is a sense 
of innovation there which is understanding the datasets that are designed for one purpose 
actually can give you insights in a whole different area… [which has been] really important in 
understanding non-observed pandemic spread’.39
From the perspective of the police, opportunities for more effective data sharing were recognised both in 
terms of sharing data across policing stakeholders and receiving data from non-police stakeholders. With 
regard to the former, the centralised functions within the policing ecosystem such as the National Police 
Coordination Centre (NPoCC) quickly established mechanisms to monitor changes in key indicators like 
PPE quantities, staff sickness and absence rates, and COVID-19 rates in local police force areas. Forces 
were asked to provide daily returns on what their sickness levels were, how much of it was COVID-19 
related, and how it was distributed across critical roles. This data would be collated and redistributed to 
forces to provide a longer-term picture of pressure on the policing service as a whole.
Whilst stakeholders were acutely aware of concerns relating to issues such as privacy and mission creep, 
as detailed in section 3.2 below, many of the public sector interviewees held the view that the more open 
approach to data sharing, which has been evident during the pandemic, has broadly been conducive 
to the public good, and therefore should continue in some form. The sharing of qualitative data, as 
discussed in Section 1, across different policing stakeholders was highlighted as an important part of their 
data-driven response. NPoCC, in partnership with the College of Policing, ran weekly online ‘knowledge 
sharing events’. These covered a whole variety of topics, such as the latest trends on domestic abuse; the 
planned response to the re-opening of the night-time economy; how investigative techniques have been 
adapted; and how staff wellbeing is monitored. This allowed different forces to share their experiences 
on planning and lessons learned. One interviewee explained, ‘it has given us a rich environment to say 
“Right, we understand some forces have experienced challenges with ‘X’, but this force has got a way of 
dealing with it”’.40
3.2 Public Concerns
We conducted both qualitative and quantitative research analysing public concerns around the sharing 
of data for the purposes of the pandemic response.41 Our qualitative research involved semi-structured 
interviews with 70 stakeholders with experience or expertise in data-driven pandemic responses, whilst 
the perceptions of a representative sample of the general public in the UK towards data sharing were 
quantitatively analysed using two surveys.42 
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44 Barnardo’s (n 3).
45 Laura Lundy and others, ‘Life Under Coronavirus: Children’s Views on their Experiences of their Human Rights’ [2021] 29 
Int J Children’s Rights 261-285.
46 As explored throughout sections 3 and 4 of this report.
47 See Sneha Dawda and others, ‘Snapshot Report 2: Tech-Driven Approaches to Public Health’ (2021)
https://www.omddac.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/OMDDAC-Snapshot-Report-2-Tech-Driven-Approaches-to-Public-Health.pdf 
accessed 16 September 2021.
48 Interview with academic stakeholder (A1).
We also engaged with 17 children and young people (aged between 11 and 18) with the support of 
children’s human rights organisation, Investing in Children.43  Children and young people have been 
described as the ‘hidden victims’ of the COVID-19 pandemic.44 They have themselves said that they have 
not felt heard,45 although many of the decisions that have been made during the pandemic have had 
significant impacts upon children and young people. Children have a right to have their views sought 
and due weight given on matters affecting them under Article 12 UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. Though the findings of this small-scale investigation into the views of children and young people 
cannot be considered representative of their views across the UK, they nonetheless provide an important 
insight into the opinions and concerns of some young people and identify key areas warranting further 
research.46
Our research findings across these areas evidence that visible information governance controls are of 
central importance in creating an environment where data sharing will be accepted by the public.
Qualitative findings: Incorporating the perspectives of key stakeholders, 
including children and young people
Interviewees acknowledged public concerns around privacy, surveillance, and a risk of ‘mission creep’ 
in view of the amount and types of data being shared across public and private sector stakeholders. 
Our analysis of digital proximity and exposure notification apps,47 for instance, highlighted the tension 
between expectations of the sharing of Test and Trace data and public understanding of how and where 
their data was being shared and used. The expectation of the NHS COVID-19 exposure notification app 
was that it would become a faster and more privacy-preserving method compared to human contact 
tracing. One interviewee stated that ‘human contact tracing is much more invasive’ and, in fact, needs 
to be as invasive as possible to be effective at managing the outbreak of the virus.48 However, in order 
to ensure sufficient downloads of the app, the public required assurance that their data was sufficiently 
protected and would not be shared more widely. The same interviewee stated that ‘the app could do 
much more if it did not have the data protection by design format’ but this design was considered 
necessary to encourage sufficient uptake. 
In general, the young people we engaged with understood the need to share 
information; all fifteen young people who expressed a view on this point said that they 
thought that it was acceptable, for example, for information to be shared with public 
bodies where COVID-19 was found in wastewater in a particular locality for the public 
good. There was disagreement, however, about who such information should be shared 
with (hospitals and doctors (12/15); local council (11/15); police (5/15); the Prime Minister 
(4/15)). If the information were to identify the young people and their families then only 
9/15 participants would still consider such information sharing acceptable. One young 
person suggested that they would want to be made aware of such information sharing 
and be provided the opportunity to consent (or indeed refuse to consent).
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Whilst stakeholders discussed an ‘institutional nervousness around sharing, linking and repurposing of 
data’49 linked in the main to uncertainties regarding the application of data protection law historically, it 
was noted that some of the ‘cultural resistance has evaporated in the face of the pandemic’.50 Consequently, 
stakeholders specifically emphasised that the importance of strong information governance becomes 
greater with increased data sharing.51 In this regard, stakeholders reported that they have been able 
to re-examine and operationalise existing data protection provisions for a more effective data-driven 
response. Guidance from the Information Commissioner’s Office on best practice in data sharing has 
been utilised, with one stakeholder reflecting that ‘it’s not the law that’s been the problem; it’s the issue 
of shared responsibilities… In ninety-nine percent of situations data protection law allows you to do 
what you want to do, provided the safeguards are there’.52 This sentiment was also recently reflected in 
the comments of the recently appointed Information Commissioner,53 John Edwards, who rejected the 
notion of a dichotomy between data protection and data-sharing: 54
‘The UK DPA and UK GDPR are a “how-to” not a “don’t-do”. I think the UK and many jurisdictions 
have finally learned that lesson through the Covid crisis’.55
Accordingly, data protection law can be interpreted as ‘enabling’ or facilitating the flow of information 
where necessary and proportionate, as opposed to simply being restrictive.56 As such, information 
governance must play an ‘end-to-end’ role in all activities involving data, beginning with the initial data 
acquisition process. As part of this, to address public concerns, the implementation of privacy-preserving 
IT architecture and technology should always be considered as one possible option.  
In addition, details of the information governance controls, mechanisms and restrictions on data sharing 
and processing must be made transparent to the public. This is necessary to provide visibility and 
reassurance to the public that the relevant risks have been considered and mitigated against, facilitating 
an environment where data sharing and analysis will be trusted.
49 Interview with regulatory stakeholder (R4). 
50 Interview with data specialist stakeholder (D3).
51 By information governance, we refer here to the controls and processes in place for the management of data within an organisation pursuant 
to relevant legal obligations such as confidentiality and data protection.
52 Interview with regulatory stakeholders (R2 and R3).
53 Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (2020) ‘DCMS Committee approves appointment of John Edwards as
next Information Commissioner’ https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/378/digital-culture-media-and-sportcommittee/news/157409/dc-
ms-committee-approves-appointment-of-john-edwards-as-next-information-commissioner/ accessed 15 September 2021.
54 Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Pre-appointment hearing for Information Commissioner’ (Thursday 9 September 2021) 
https://parliamentlive.tv/event/index/1508ef32-ec1d-4295-a5bf-aa8cd8211e7a accessed 15 September 2021 at 10:05.
55 ibid 10:05-10:07.
56 Interestingly, though data protection law was perceived by some stakeholders as a barrier to data sharing, this predominantly arose from 
uncertainty and a resultant risk-averse attitude, as opposed to the law being used as justification or an excuse to refuse to share data.
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Quantitative findings: the public’s perceptions of data sharing for COVID-19 
purposes
We deployed two surveys to understand public perceptions of data-sharing for COVID-19 purposes.57 
The first survey explored the sharing of medical data and mobility data. The second explored the public’s 
perceptions of wastewater sampling (a health surveillance approach that has been employed during the 
COVID-19 pandemic). 58
Both surveys were deployed using the software Qualtrics59, and recruitment of nationally representative 
samples regarding age, sex, and ethnicity (according to the UK 2011 Census from the Office of National 
Statistics60) was conducted by the intermediary Prolific.ac.61 1,003 participants were recruited for the 
Medical and Mobility Data survey, and 299 participants were recruited for the Wastewater survey (see 
Table 1 in Appendix I for details of participant demographics).
Both surveys included questions that used a choice-based multiple conjoint structure, whereby participants 
were asked to compare pairs of data-sharing scenarios and for each pair choose the scenario that they 
preferred (see Figure 1 in Appendix I for an example of a paired-scenarios comparison). The data-sharing 
scenarios differed on a set of key data-sharing “attributes” (e.g. what data is being shared, and the UK 
COVID-19 Alert level under which the data-sharing request was made).62 By asking the participants to 
express their preferences over many pairs of different data-sharing scenarios, we were able to infer, via 
the use of multinomial logit regression,63 the impacts of the attributes on data-sharing preference.
Inter-organisational data sharing preferences 
Our results evidence that the public are likely to be concerned about data sharing between certain 
organisations. In both the surveys, we found that our participants preferred to share data with their 
Local Authority and preferred to share data with their devolved nation’s Public Health Body even more, 
when compared to a commercial company, as shown in Figure 1 below. Also, our participants showed 
little preference for sharing with their Regional Police Force when compared to preference for sharing 
with a commercial company. These results were consistent across the Medical and Mobility Data survey 
and the Wastewater survey – despite the broadly non-identifiable nature of wastewater data - suggesting 
that the organisations that the UK public prefers to share their data with is consistent irrespective of the 
type of data is being shared.
57 For more findings and recommendations from both surveys please see: Selina Sutton and others, ‘‘SNAPSHOT REPORT 4:
Survey of Public Perceptions of Data Sharing for COVID-19 related purposes’ (2021) https://www.omddac.org.uk/news/snapshot-report-4-pu-
blic-perceptions-survey/ and OMDDAC, ‘Survey 2: Wastewater Health Surveillance’ (2021) https://www.omddac.org.uk/news/survey-2-wastewa-
ter-health-surveillance/ both accessed 5 October 2021.
58 Someone who has COVID-19 will shed fragments of the virus into their faeces, which then enter the sewage system when they go to the 
toilet. Therefore, taking a sample of wastewater from the sewage system and analysing it to detect these virus fragments can indicate the 
presence and prevalence of COVID-19 outbreaks. For further information, see Matthew Wade and others, ‘Wastewater COVID-19 Monitoring in 
the UK: Summary for SAGE – 19/11/20’ (2020) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/940919/S0908_Wast ewater_C19_monitoring_SAGE.pdf accessed 16 September 2021.
59 Qualtrics, ‘Qualtrics.’ Version June 2021. https://www.qualtrics.com accessed 16 September 2021.
60 Office of National Statistics, ‘2011 Census.’ https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/2011census accessed 12th August 2021.
61 Prolific, ‘Prolific.’ Version June 2021. Available at: https://www.prolific.co accessed 16 September 2021.
62 See Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix I for more details on attributes and their settings.
63 Kenneth E. Train, Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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Figure 1. Change in preference when changing the data holder attribute (with all other attributes held fixed) from the 
Medical and Mobility Data survey (left) and the Wastewater survey (right). Point estimates (dots) and 95% confidence 
intervals (vertical bars) were obtained via multinomial logit models. The vertical dashed line in centre of each graph 
indicates preference for reference value (in this case ‘Company’). Other results overlapping with this line indicate no 
change in preference to this reference value.
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Patterns of willingness to share data
Both of our surveys have consistently illustrated the diverse positions that the participants took when it 
came to willingness to share data. After selecting the data-sharing scenario that they preferred in each 
paired-scenarios comparison, participants were then asked to rate how willing they would be to share 
their data in their preferred scenario along a Likert scale of 5 options, ranging from “Very Unwilling” to 
“Very Willing”. For each survey, we carried out a latent class analysis64 on the Likert scale data gathered 
from the scenarios that the participants preferred. The analysis forms clusters (or groups) of participants, 
where participants within the same cluster gave similar answers to the Likert scale questions. After 
examining various models with different numbers of clusters, we identified seven separate clusters of 
participants in the Medical and Mobility Data survey and five clusters of participants in the Wastewater 
survey. The similarity in grouping between the two surveys is striking, despite their different foci (one on 
medical and mobility data and one on wastewater data). 
In both surveys, we identified a cluster of participants that we named “The Committed to Sharing” (15.3%: 
153/1003 in the Medical and Mobility data survey and 33.3%: 100/299 in the Wastewater data survey), 
who almost always answered “Very Willing” to share data under their preferred scenarios. Similarly, the 
cluster that we called “The Eager to Share” appeared in both surveys. Participants in this cluster (20.5%: 
206/1003 and 31.3%: 94/299) almost always chose “Willing” under their preferred scenarios. 
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There were, however, participants who were more wary of sharing their data in both surveys. For 
example, in both surveys, we identified “The Undecideds” cluster, the participants in which often 
answered “Neither Willing nor Unwilling” (Figure 2). Only a small number of participants, 65 (6.5%) and 
20 (6.7%) respectively, in the Medical-Mobility survey and the Wastewater survey belong to this cluster. 
We also identified “The Resistant to Sharing” cluster in both surveys (9.2%: 92/1003 and 6.7%: 20/299), 
whose answers were mostly on the “Unwilling” side of the Likert scale (Figure 3).
Finally, in the Medical and Mobility data survey there was a cluster that we named “The Opt-Outers” – 
participants who almost always answered “Very Unwilling”, although this only contained 30 (3%) of the 
1003 participants in that survey.
Figure 2. Patterns of data-sharing willingness for the participants in “The Undecided” clusters. 
The taller the bar is, the more often the participants chose the corresponding option.
23
Medical and Mobility Data survey
Wastewater survey
This diversity of positions that our participants took further evidences the need for the information 
governance requirements behind data sharing to be accessible and transparent to the public, for it may 
be that through such communication, those who are currently unsure will have their concerns addressed. 
Of course, there may be members of the public that will not change their willingness to share data, but 




























Very Unwilling Unwilling Neither Willing Very Willing
Figure 3. Patterns of data-sharing willingness for the participants in “The Resistant to Sharing” clusters.
Same interpretation as in Figure 2.
“The Resistant to Sharing” cluster
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Data-detail preferences
Other findings from the Medical and Mobility Data survey evidence differences in what data our 
participants were willing to share with their preferred and non-preferred organisations. We devised two 
six-point scales, one for medical data and one for mobility data.65 Starting with ”No Data”, each option 
on these scales was a different type of data, their order reflecting increasing  amounts of data detail.
The final option on the medical scale was data from “Medical Records since birth” and on the mobility 
scale was data of “All destinations, and routes taken”. Participants were asked to choose what data, from 
the options along the scale, they would share with a particular organisation bearing in mind i) the UK 
COVID-19 Alert Level, and ii) whether the data was identifiable or anonymous. Therefore, to cover all the 
different combinations of Alert Level and ‘identifiable‘ or ’anonymous’, each of our 1,003 participants 
were asked this question 6 times for each organisation, resulting in 6,018 answers for each organisation.
The results of these questions underline the need for public transparency and consultation in inter-
organisation data-sharing for there are notable differences in, for example, what data our participants 
would share with their Regional Police Force and their Public Health Body. When we consider the sharing 
of medical data across different contexts (different COVID-19 alert levels, and if the data was anonymous 
or identifiable), in most cases (37% of answers, 2,209 answers out of 6,018) our participants answered 
that they would limit the data they shared with their Regional Police Force to their COVID-19 test results, 
with another 31% of answers / 1,867 answers out of 6,018 saying that they would not give any data 
to their Regional Police Force. In comparison, in most cases (66% / 3,958 answers out of 6,018) our 
participants answered that they would be willing to share more detailed data than their COVID-19 test 
results with their devolved nation’s Public Health Body, including 23% / 1,414 answers out of 6,018 being 
willingness to share medical records since birth (see figure 4).






















Medical Data: Regional Police Force
Medical Data: Local Authority
Medical Data: Public Health
Figure 4. Results of the Medical Data Detail Slider questions by Data Holder
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However, our findings also indicate that there may be some types of data that the public would be 
less concerned about if it were to be shared across organisations. For example, when we consider the 
sharing of mobility data across different contexts (different COVID-19 alert levels, and if the data was 
anonymous or identifiable), the number of answers that indicate willingness to share what countries 
had been visited and when was relatively equitable across the four organisations (Company: 22% / 1,345, 
Regional Police Force: 20% / 1,199, Local Authority: 21% / 1,267, Public Health Body: 19% / 1,163 (all out of 
6,018 answers)). The result was also similar for willingness to share which towns/cities had been visited 
and when (Company: 17% / 1,053, Regional Police Force: 18% / 1,083, Local Authority: 19% / 1,172, Public 
Health Body: 19% / 1,144 (all out of 6,018 answers)) (see figure 5).
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Recommendations: 
• Data acquisition, sharing, and processing activities should begin and end with 
robust information governance requirements which are transparent to the public. All 
data processing should undergo a data protection and human rights impact assessment 
at the outset. This assessment should not be regarded as simply a ‘tick box’ exercise, but 
instead should be a living document which is revisited regularly throughout the data 
‘lifecycle’ on a continuous basis. Government and public bodies must also be prepared to 
impose legally enforceable limitations on themselves regarding the use of certain data. 
Information governance controls, including any such limitations, should be communicated to 
the public to create an environment where data sharing and analysis is trusted and accepted.
• The design of any data-sharing initiatives should aim to foster and maximise public 
acceptability by:
• being transparent about which organisations have access to certain types of   
data and when this data is being shared. From the outset, individuals should have   
access to this information to enable properly informed decision-making. An information 
sharing notice should be published which explains what data is being shared and with 
whom. 
• not assuming that the public are comfortable with their data being shared 
across all sections of the public sector. This is irrespective of the type of data or the 
public purpose of the data use. This should be taken into account in determining the 
public acceptability of any data sharing initiative;
• avoiding a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Bespoke data-sharing initiatives and methods 
for communicating their design could be developed by understanding which social 
groups or demographics are most likely to either be dissuaded from, generally undecided 
about, or resistant to data-sharing and why, taking into account local knowledge and 
preferences;
• providing options for how much detail to share. The ability to choose between 
several ‘levels’ of detail in the data that is being shared would allow individuals to engage 
with the data-sharing initiative in a way that they are comfortable with.
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4. Responsibility
It is clear from our findings that all sharing and processing of data must be undertaken responsibly in 
order to preserve public trust. This key theme of ‘responsibility’ is reflected in the fourth core pillar of 
the National Data Strategy: 
‘As we drive increased use of data, we must ensure that it is used responsibly, in a way that is 
lawful, secure, fair, ethical, sustainable and accountable, while also supporting innovation and 
research’.66
Our research findings identified a direct link between responsibility and the need for transparency 
regarding the use of data. This is also reflected in the National Data Strategy which makes clear that 
transparency is an important requirement for responsible data use: ‘Enhancing individual awareness 
about the public benefits of data use requires transparency about such benefits, as well as a commitment 
to ensuring that people have trust and confidence in the use of their data and that it is adequately 
safeguarded’.67 In our recommendations, we highlight the importance of transparency and public 
engagement regarding the way that data is used and shared, as well as the capabilities of data more 
fundamentally. This should be concerned with engaging all members of the population, including 
underrepresented communities as well as children and young people. 
4.1 Transparency
The ‘power’ of data and its limitations
The issue of transparency was prominent throughout OMDDAC’s study of data-driven responses to the 
pandemic. One essential aspect of this issue was in the use of the term ‘data-driven’ itself; interviewees 
raised concerns that by referring to a decision as having been ‘driven’ or ‘informed’ by data, it gives the 
impression that the decision is wholly objective or ‘beyond dispute’,68 without giving due regard to the 
actual complexity of the situation.69 As summarised by one stakeholder: 
‘the actual situation is much more complex. Those decisions are in turn informed by value 
judgements on which datasets are actually being used and whose data is actually being 
evaluated… we then make value judgements about what the data implies and what we are 
going to do with it. If we understand that facts are theory laden and value laden, then any use 
of the data to inform decisions implies values’.70
Indeed, many of the decisions relating to the pandemic (for example opening schools or imposing 
lockdowns) have necessarily involved the weighing up of risks and relevant factors according to policy 
priorities: ‘those decisions involve other aspects like impact on mental health and economic impact. 
These aspects are hard to compute, so the decision is complicated’.71
66 UK National Data Strategy (n 1).
67 Ibid.
68 Interview with third sector stakeholder (T1).
69 Relatedly, the Office for Statistics Regulation in its annual review report for casework between 1 April 2020 and 31 March 2021 highlighted 
that this year (2020/21) was the first year where the use or misuse of statistics was not the most common issue raised in casework; the category 
with the highest number of cases related to the quality and trustworthiness of data. The increase in this theme reflects the observation that the 
pandemic caused an increase in public interest in the trustworthy production and publication of statistics, particularly as statistics were being 
used so frequently and publicly to justify decisions affecting peoples’ everyday lives (for example whether or not to impose restrictions): UKSA 
and OSR, Annual Review of UK Statistics Authority Casework 2020/21 (September 2021) https://osr.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/wpcontent/
uploads/2021/09/Annual-Review-of-UK-Statistics-Authority-Casework-2020-21.pdf accessed 5 October 2021.
70 Interview with academic stakeholder (A2).
71 Interviews with data specialist, government and academic stakeholders (G6, G9, G10, A8).
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Moreover, while statistical modelling and data science have been instrumental in informing key 
pandemic decisions, stakeholders felt that greater transparency was required to ensure that outcomes of 
modelling were not presented, or perceived as, ‘the truth’. Statistical modelling techniques are regarded 
as particularly effective in extracting additional value from data regarding potential future outcomes. 
Nonetheless, they inherently involve levels of uncertainty and rely on assumptions, for instance regarding 
behavioural parameters which cannot easily be measured.  
‘I keep telling political leadership not to use maths beyond its power. People often ask you 
to solve a problem with modelling or statistics. Human judgement also needs to be involved. 
Maths can only tell you so much … because we can’t measure those behavioural parameters. ... 
it’s modelling for illustration, modelling for building understanding, modelling for storytelling 
and that is it. Because that’s such an important part of the epistemology of mathematical 
modelling and people often assume a naive “push button, computer tells answer” - this is not 
what I think the purpose of mathematical modelling is’.72
Inclusive transparency: informing children and young people
More broadly, greater levels of transparency regarding how decisions have been reached has been called 
for as a matter of paramount importance given the unprecedented restrictions on liberty that have been 
introduced as part of the pandemic response.73 Being open and transparent about the use of data is 
regarded as crucial to building public trust and aiding cooperation. According to the Public Administration 
and Constitutional Affairs Committee, ‘this is not just a moral issue, it is integral to the response to this 
pandemic. Transparency builds trust and trust aids compliance with rules’.74 Interviewees emphasised 
that this must be accessible for all sections of the population, including those from underrepresented 
communities as well as children and young people. 
Whilst the young people who were engaged as part of our research were aware of some of the policies 
adopted by Government to tackle the pandemic, not all young people felt that they knew how Government 
is using information and technology to help tackle COVID-19.75 Over half of the young people76 who shared 
their views with us felt young people had not been given enough information about the Government’s 
decisions during COVID-19, and a further three were unsure. There was concern expressed that action 
had not been taken to make young people more aware of data-driven responses to the pandemic, 
including for example the use of wastewater for predicting COVID-19 outbreaks. Moreover, seven of the 
fifteen young people shared that they were not aware of the proposed grading system for GCSEs and 
A levels in 2020, 77 three of whom were 17-18 years of age; a surprising finding given the significance of 
these proposals for young people. 
72 Interview with data specialist stakeholder (D9).
73 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Government transparency and accountability during Covid 19: 
The data underpinning decisions (HC 2021 803) https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/5076/documents/50285/default/ 
accessed 16 September 2021.
74 Ibid.
75 In response to the questionnaire, three of the young people said they did not know how the Government is using information and technology 
to tackle COVID-19.
76 8 out of 15 young people.
77 A-levels and GCSEs: How did the exam algorithm work? (BBC, 2020) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/explainers-53807730  
accessed 24 September 2021.
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Relatedly, the young people expressed concern at the lack of easily accessible, understandable and 
reliable information about the decisions that have been taken. To obtain the information they need 
to take informed decisions, the young people we engaged with tended to rely on schools, youth 
organisations, news broadcasts, their families and other trusted adults. Social media was also raised, 
though young people were critical about the reliability and, therefore, trustworthiness of information 
that was available on social media and suggested that more effective use could be made of government 
websites to provide information. Indeed, young people suggested these sites were often difficult to 
navigate, read and understand.
Recommendations: 
• To ensure transparency, future policy decisions informed by data modelling should 
be accompanied by explanatory statements which are published in a format that is 
accessible to all sections of the public. The Government Office for Science should retain 
overall responsibility for this obligation, with each Chief Scientific Officer responsible for 
ensuring transparency of data use within their respective department. Statements should 
include:
• Clear signposting on where and how to access the underlying data and statistics used 
to reach the decision (which should also be published);
• Explanation of the analysis undertaken, accompanied by justification for the 
methodological choices used to inform the decision;
• Details of relevant limitations or uncertainties associated with the data and/or 
analysis;
• Details of assumptions which have been incorporated in the analysis; 
• Explanation of how factors which are not data-driven – including human judgements, 
behavioural considerations and policy priorities – have been incorporated into the 
decision.
• A summary or digest of the above points, which conveys key findings, clearly avoids 
misrepresentation and explains what the findings do not show.
 
• The general form and content that explanatory digests will take, as well as the 
means of communication, should be decided in consultation with different sections 
of the public, including young people. Important information must be readily available 
through a variety of means to ensure sufficient access. Groups such as children and young 
people are not homogenous, meaning that multiple strategies are needed to reach them 
adequately. 
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Data sharing across the public sector
Our survey findings, as set out in detail in Section 3, highlighted the public importance of who data is 
being shared with. For example, our participants preferred scenarios where data was shared with their 
devolved nation’s Public Health Body or their Local Authority as compared with their Regional Police 
Force. Furthermore, there was little difference in participants’ preference for sharing data with their 
Regional Police Force, as compared with a commercial company. 
Similar concerns were also expressed by the young people who engaged with our 
research. When asked whether it was appropriate for information to be shared regarding 
COVID-19 prevalence, all young people considered that data collected from testing 
wastewater should be shared in the public interest if anonymised. However, where that 
data is identifiable three of the young people  expressed that they would not be willing 
to share, and a further two were unsure. Interestingly, whilst five of the young people 
stated that they would be happy to share wastewater data with the police , concern was 
expressed by others, due to a lack of clarity as to why the police would access to this 
information. Indeed, for some young people it was felt that ‘the police had no business in 
knowing this information’.
In the context of policing, the issue of transparency was especially evident during our analysis of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the Department 
for Health and Social Care, establishing a permissive regime for sharing of public health data. OMDDAC’s 
research concluded that it was difficult for the general public to understand how public health data was 
being shared with the police and for what purposes.78 Had the MoU been published earlier than it was, 
there could have been far greater confidence in the way that the police were accessing, handling, using 
and retaining the data under consideration. The delay allowed for uncertainty regarding the possible 
linkages of health data received by the police with entirely different records, and how the data is actively 
segregated from other data in police systems. This emphasises the importance not just of transparency, 
but the timing of it, and the manner in which key public concerns are addressed. In other instances, 
police forces in the UK have been more proactive in their approach to transparency. For example, one 
case study reviewed by OMDDAC was the creation of the Coronavirus Interventions System (CVI) by 
Police Scotland, a data recording tool that not only ensured up-to-date information on enforcement 
trends, but collated information on wider policing practice in relation to the other ‘E’s’ in the police’s ‘4E’s’ 
framework79 for managing the pandemic. Data from the CVI was made available to produce valuable 
insights around the proportionality of enforcement. While this type of partnership certainly improved 
public scrutiny of how the police managed their response to the pandemic, it does not detract from the 
need to have formalised governance and oversight procedures in place at the same time. 
78 Ardi Janjeva and others, ‘Snapshot Report 3: Policing and Public Safety (2021) https://www.omddac.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/OMD-
DAC-Snapshot-Report-3-Policing-and-Public-Safety.pdf accessed 16 September 2021.
79 Enforcement, engagement with communities, explanation, and encouragement to return home. See: College of Policing,
‘Understanding the law’. Available at: https://www.college.police.uk/guidance/covid-19/understanding-law.
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Recommendations: 
• All sections of the public, including young people, should be transparently informed 
about which organisations have access to their data. Information must be made available 
to the public in an accessible form for all sections of the public in order to allay concerns 
about misuse and allow informed decision-making. Specifically, this information should be 
easy to find and understand. At a minimum, this should include what data is being collected, 
when, and if it will be stored with identifying information. Further, it should specify how 
and why an organisation is collecting, using and sharing data, and how it will be stored. In 
particular, details of inter-organisation data-sharing (e.g. a Public Health Body sharing data 
with the police), the limitations on such data-sharing, and the governance measures in place 
should be publicly available.
• Where Memoranda of Understanding are agreed between health agencies and 
enforcement bodies regarding sensitive health data, it is vital that the terms and 
conditions are made as transparent to the public as possible. Transparency around the 
way that sensitive information is accessed, handled, used and retained should be the default 
position in similar situations in future. Clarifying the status of public health data received by 
the police in relation to other police databases is one important step in this.
4.2 Public Engagement and Trust
In general, interviewees were acutely aware of the privacy implications and negative public perceptions 
regarding the uses of data during the pandemic. Interestingly, however, it was reported by some local 
authority stakeholders that having consulted with members of the community there appeared to be a 
pre-existing assumption or expectation that data would be used in many of the ways that it has during 
the pandemic, often amongst young people. However, our research found that seven of the young 
people whose views were sought did not think that young people had been given enough information 
about the government’s decisions during COVID-19, and a further three were unsure whether sufficient 
information had been provided.  
For some young people, there appear to be public trust issues linked to a lack of discussion with them 
about how and why organisations might need to use young people’s information; and more general 
concerns about certain organisations. Again, young people seemed to be particularly unclear about why 
the police would need information gained from wastewater analysis and expressed concern about the 
police having information about people being told to self-isolate. One participant raised the concern that 
the police could use that information simply to fine people, with a disproportionate impact on poorer 
families. 
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Ten of the young people whose views were sought considered that there had not been 
enough discussions with young people about the response to COVID-19, with a further 
ten expressing that young people’s views should have been sought before decisions 
were made which impacted upon them, and their futures.80 It should be acknowledged 
therefore that children and young people wish to express their views. They believe that 
they have much to contribute to discussion and that they should be consulted on issues 
which affect them. A more effective strategy is needed to inform and consult young 
people. The young people we engaged with suggested a range of different means by 
which government and policy makers can seek their views including: through schools, 
via surveys, through youth organisations and other trusted adults. The young people 
also suggested social media as another possible method of communication; however, 
they cautioned over-reliance on this method in light of its perceived lack of reliability and 
also, more pragmatically, because it cannot be assumed that all young people use social 
media. Multiple strategies for reaching children and young people should therefore be 
employed. Fundamentally, the most effective approach for reaching young people can 
only be determined by speaking to young people about how they want to be consulted 
and communicated with. 
In a similar way to the discussion on transparency, our research found that there were elements of the 
police’s data-driven response to the pandemic which risked undermining public trust. This was especially 
the case with the way in which the Amendment to the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Self-
Isolation) (England) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1045) was brought into law, without being debated in 
Parliament first. While it is difficult to quantify exactly how far this undermined public trust in the police’s 
pandemic response, there is a risk that it could have perpetuated a view amongst sections of the public 
that the Government was treating the pandemic as a public order crisis rather than a public health crisis.
In general, government stakeholders that we spoke to were keen to emphasise the importance of public 
engagement going forward regarding future uses of data following the COVID-19 pandemic, so as not 
to make assumptions regarding public acceptability, to promote transparency and to ensure public 
confidence and trust. 
‘There could be implications for information governance post-pandemic. I’m careful about 
making assumptions, because we do have a particular licence to continue to do things safely, 
so it has been important that we don’t omit that step because it’s vital that we maintain 
public confidence in how we are using data both during the pandemic and afterwards. ... I 
think when looking to the future we’re being very careful not to make assumptions about that 
public licence and need to make sure it’s maintained; we are planning to do some further 
public engagement, looking carefully at what frameworks we can create that enable use of 
public data for innovation and creating public benefit.  We are very much embarking on that 
conscious that we can’t make assumptions that we just carry forward what’s happening during 
exceptional times’.81
80 A minority (4 young people) said they did not think young people should be asked before decisions were made which impacted on them 
(i.e. in relation to closing/opening schools, mask wearing at school etc.
81 Interview with government stakeholder (G17).
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Recommendations:
•  The Government Office for Science should initiate a new public conversation post-
pandemic, to consult with, inform and educate the public regarding the use of their 
data.  There are concerns amongst the general public over specific types of data-sharing 
which should be addressed promptly. A national communication campaign is needed 
regarding the use of medical/health data and the steps to be taken if people do not want 
their data to be used or shared in a certain way.
•  Public consultations must be inclusive of all members of the population, including 
underrepresented groups and young people. Rather than a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, 
multiple strategies are required for consulting and communicating with different members 
of the population. These strategies should be determined by direct engagement with 
members of these groups, including children and young people. 
34
Concluding Recommendation and Next Steps
Our findings demonstrate the complexity of issues involved in the use of data for decision-making as 
well as the sharing of individual’s data, particularly across multiple public sector authorities. The central 
importance of data quality and integrity, robust information governance mechanisms and public 
transparency for creating an environment where data analysis and sharing can be trusted and accepted 
in an emergency context is clearly apparent from our findings. In conclusion, we suggest that these 
obligations should be reinforced by a regulatory oversight mechanism: 
  
Recommendation:
• During emergency situations, an appropriate independent oversight body should be 
appointed (with concomitant resourcing), with the remit to make sure that:
• use and sharing of data by central government and public bodies for operational and 
public policy purposes serve the public good;
• data use and sharing are supported by appropriate public transparency about data 
sources and methods of analysis;
• data analysis is conducted with quality and integrity;
• data sharing is overseen by independent governance and is subject to appropriate 
controls, conditions and time-limitations.
This function would be supported by a standing committee of senior representatives of public sector 
data controllers (reflecting national, regional and local bodies) in order to facilitate appropriate and 
time-limited arrangements for data sharing and analysis.
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Further Research
In order to gain a greater understanding of the concerns of people who were either unwilling or very 
unwilling to share their data, a follow up survey should be undertaken to investigate the reasoning and 
factors underlying the public’s perceptions and areas of uncertainty. In particular, there is a clear need 
for a deeper understanding of why public preference differs between mobility data and medical data, 
as well as the low preference with regard to sharing data with the police service, as evidenced in our 
survey findings. Further research to attain such an understanding will be important to inform future 
government data-sharing initiatives as well as the imminent data protection reforms.
Additionally, OMDDAC’s engagement with children and young people highlights the need for further 
in-depth research in this area. The young people involved in our research made clear that they thought 
young people in general have not been considered enough during the pandemic. Our findings indicate 
that more could be done to ensure young people are able to access information about policies which 
impact directly upon them and, crucially, to capture and consider their views. It should be recognised 
that qualitative research exploring young people’s views appears to have been ‘thin on the ground’. 82 
OMDDAC’s research illustrates that further investigation is necessary to better understand the views 
and opinions of children and young people towards the data-driven pandemic responses and, more 
fundamentally, to ascertain the most effective methods of engagement in order to ensure that their 
voices are heard.  
Reflections and Learnings from a Distributed, Remote, Interdisciplinary Research 
Project
Finally, we reflect on the project’s methodological approach. OMDDAC’s interdisciplinarity has not been 
limited to a series of parallel single-discipline work-packages. The key to OMDDAC’s methodology is the 
involvement of all researchers in the planning and conduct of the research, and production of outputs, 
with each output being led by an allocated researcher or team of researchers.  
The project has been carried out in a fully distributed and remote manner. This experience has enabled 
us to identify benefits, risks and challenges which, if future remote and distributed research is to be 
successful, must be addressed. 83
82 Stephen Coleman and others, ‘ THE INTERNET ON OUR OWN TERMS: How Children and Young People Deliberated About Their Digital Rights’ 
(2017) https://casma.wp.horizon.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Internet-On-Our-Own-Terms.pdf accessed 4 October 2021. 
83 Rachel Allsopp, Claire Bessant, Keith Ditcham, Ardi Janjeva, Guangquan Li, Marion Oswald and Mark Warner, ‘Observing data-driven 




The theoretical benefits often posited for interdisciplinarity research will only be realised by 
designing the integration – in terms of responsibilities and involvement of each discipline 
and the degree of interdisciplinarity expected - into every aspect of a project.  There is a 
need for new university processes to support interdisciplinary researchers and cut through 
departmental and disciplinary barriers, with such integrated interdisciplinarity being sought 
out by funders in their calls.
Successful interdisciplinary collaboration depends upon building up understanding between 
disciplines.  This requires time to build relationships, trust and understanding between team 
members using ‘both task talk and relational talk.’ 84 
The challenges of communication and understanding that integrated interdisciplinarity 
creates can be transformative. Researchers are challenged ‘to think hard(er) for effective 
communication and opportunity for the idea to develop further following the questions asked 
and contributions made by other researchers from different angles’ leading to more insightful 
and impactful outcomes.85
The interdisciplinary ‘pair’ online interviewing method developed by OMDDAC has expanded 
the range of individuals and organisations that the project has been able to reach, with 
considerable advantages from an inclusivity and diversity perspective.  Planning for shorter 
interviews is necessary however to account for limitations on rapport-building and screen 
fatigue.
It will be a false economy for universities and funders to assume that research can continue to 
be conducted in a fully remote manner with consequent budget savings.  There are certainly 
a number of opportunities for research presented by remote methodologies.  It will important 
however for new researchers in particular that they are not isolated from opportunities to 
build working relationships and academic networks by in-person contact. Our research has 
indicated that certain groups such as young people may be particularly difficult to engage with 






84 Jessica Leigh Thompson (2009) Building Collective Communication Competence in Interdisciplinary Research Teams, Journal of Applied 
Communication Research, 37:3, 278-297, DOI: 10.1080/00909880903025911.
85 ‘Observing data-driven approaches to Covid-19: Reflections from a distributed, remote, interdisciplinary research project’ (n 83).
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Appendix I - Methodology
This appendix provides detail of the individual methods employed during the project. The OMDDAC 
qualitative and quantitative study design was reviewed and approved by the ethical review process at 
Northumbria University.
Stakeholder Interviews and Case Study Analysis
The OMDDAC project began with a foundational ‘stakeholder mapping and landscape assessment’, which 
was conducted between November 2020 and January 2021. Drawing on the multidisciplinary expertise 
and networks of the OMDDAC team, this was achieved primarily through document review, supplemented 
by remote interviews with 34 stakeholders, selected using a purposive, selective sampling strategy. 
Participant stakeholders were drawn from a wide range of relevant sectors, backgrounds and disciplines, 
including: the private sector; government; academia; police and law enforcement; organisations 
specialising in the use, management and protection of data; the medical profession; charities and the 
third sector; regulators and the legal profession. To maintain the anonymity of interviewees, interview 
notes were pseudonymised and all findings are presented in a way which is non-attributable.
Each interview during this initial research phase was conducted by two OMDDAC researchers, based upon 
a semi-structured interview guide, and typically lasted between 30 minutes and one hour. Questioning 
was led by one interviewer whilst the second focused primarily on contemporaneous notetaking, though 
follow up questions were also raised by the second researcher who often had a different disciplinary 
background or research interest. As a result, the breadth and depth of interview data collected was 
extensive. This ‘pair-interviewing’ approach also aided in ensuring adherence to the short timescales of 
this time-critical COVID-19 project, whilst maintaining the necessary rapport between the researchers 
and interviewees.
From this initial mapping exercise, specific case studies were identified (based on significance and 
potential impact) for deeper analysis during the second stage of the project, across three broad sectors: 
data-driven pandemic public policy,86 tech-driven approaches to public health,87 and policing and public 
safety.88 Within these broad sectors, specific data-driven pandemic responses were identified as case 
studies for further investigation, as follows: 
•  Data-sharing, linkage and ‘innovation’;
•  Predictive pandemic modelling;
•  Data-driven support for vulnerable residents;
•  Digital proximity and exposure notification;
•  Risk-scoring algorithms;
•  COVID-status certification;
•  Police use of public health data;
•  Monitoring of crime and enforcement trends; and
•  Monitoring of police resourcing and wellbeing.
86 Rachel Allsopp and others, ‘Snapshot Report 1: Data-Driven Public Policy’ (2021) ‘https://www.omddac.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/OM-
DDAC-Snapshot-Report-1-Public-Policy.pdf accessed 16 September 2021.
87 Sneha Dawda and others, ‘Snapshot Report 2: Tech-Driven Approaches to Public Health’ (2021)
https://www.omddac.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/OMDDAC-Snapshot-Report-2-Tech-Driven-Approaches-to-Public-Health.pdf accessed 
16 September 2021.
88 Ardi Janjeva and others, ‘Snapshot Report 3: Policing and Public Safety (2021) https://www.omddac.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/OMD-
DAC-Snapshot-Report-3-Policing-and-Public-Safety.pdf accessed 16 September 2021.
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A purposive, selective sampling strategy was then used to identify participant stakeholders able to 
provide detailed information with regard to the above areas of concern. A semi-structured interview 
guide was collaboratively developed, enabling OMDDAC researchers from multiple disciplines to 
obtain data concurrently in a consistent manner. This approach, in addition, allowed for flexibility to 
probe specialised areas of knowledge and experience. Stakeholder interviews were conducted with 36 
participants between February and April 2021, again remotely in pairs, and typically lasted approximately 
one hour. These interviews were also conducted on the basis that the identities of the interviewees 
would remain confidential, with their contributions non-attributable; this element of the research design 
being crucial to ensuring stakeholders felt able to freely share details of their pandemic experiences. 
Analysis of the interview data was conducted using an inductive, grounded theory approach to identify 
codes representing recurring themes. On identification of such themes, further granular analysis was 
conducted to explore the cross-cutting trends and challenges experienced by stakeholders in greater 
detail, in order to identify the important lessons learned as set out in this research compendium. 
Representative Public Surveys
In tandem with the interview data collection, we developed two surveys to explore the public’s willingness 
to share their data for COVID-19 related purposes. The first survey explored two types of data that we 
as a nation have become somewhat familiar with sharing over the course of the pandemic: medical data 
and mobility data. The topic of the second survey was more specific. Someone who has COVID-19 will 
shed fragments of the virus into their faeces, which then enter the sewage system when they go to the 
toilet. Therefore, taking a sample of wastewater from the sewage system and analysing it to detect these 
fragments of the virus can indicate the presence and prevalence of COVID-19 outbreaks.89 A particularly 
novel public health surveillance approach is wastewater sampling. Thus, we wished to explore the 
public’s perceptions of this public health surveillance technique.Both the surveys were deployed using 
the software Qualtrics, and recruitment of nationally representative samples in regard to age, sex, and 
ethnicity (according to the UK 2011 Census from the Office of National Statistics91) was conducted by the 
intermediary, Prolific.ac.92 1,003 participants were recruited for the Medical and Mobility Data survey, 






89 Matthew Wade and others, ‘Wastewater COVID-19 Monitoring in the UK: Summary for SAGE – 19/11/20’ (2020)
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/940919/S0908_Wastewater_C19_monito-
ring_SAGE.pdf accessed 16 September 2021.
90 Qualtrics, ‘Qualtrics.’ Version June 2021. https://www.qualtrics.com accessed 16 September 2021.
91 Office of National Statistics, ‘2011 Census.’ https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/2011census accessed 12th August 2021.
92 Prolific, ‘Prolific.’ Version June 2021. Available at: https://www.prolific.co accessed 16 September 2021.
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Medical and Mobility 
Data survey
Medical and Mobility 
Data survey
Age
18-27       14% / 138    18% / 53
28-37       18% / 179    18% / 54
38-47       19% / 193    18% / 55
48-57       15% / 151   16% / 49















Male       49% / 486    49% / 145





Table 1. Participant demographics
Table 2. Survey submissions
To ensure good quality data, each survey included two sets of three attention checks, and participants 
were informed that there would be attention checks and that their data would be rejected if they failed 
some of them at the start of the survey. Table 2 details the number of submissions that were rejected 
as well as how many submissions were returned (the participant began the survey but then decided to 
leave), and timed-out (the participant became inactive). 
8% / 76 
4% / 40 












For taking part in the Medical and Mobility Data survey, which took 17 minutes and 30 seconds on 
average to complete, participants received £2.23 in renumeration. The survey was released at 11:00am 
on 14 June and it took just over 48 hours to receive responses from 1,003 participants, the vast majority 
of whom submitted responses in the first 24 hours.
For taking part in the Wastewater survey, which took 13 minutes and 43 seconds on average to complete, 
participants received £1.37 in renumeration. The survey was released at 1:45pm on 3 September and it 
took just over 48 hours to receive responses from 299 participants, the vast majority of whom submitted 
responses in the first 24 hours.
Regarding question types, two were consistent across the two surveys, and one additional question type 
was asked in the Medical and Mobility Data survey.
In both surveys we asked participants to compare a series of data sharing scenarios and then choose 
the one which they preferred (see figure 1 for an example question). The ways in which the data sharing 
options differ are known as ’attributes’ and the different options within each attributes are known as 
‘levels’ (see tables 3 and 4 for the attributes and levels used in each survey). This is a Choice-based Multiple 
Conjoint Analysis study design. Two or more options that differ in multiple ways are compared side-by-
side and the participant chooses their preferred option. It is thought that by forcing the participant to 
make a choice, aspects that are the most pertinent to such decision-making become evident. Therefore, 
this method deconstructs an overall judgement into its component parts and in doing so, the aspects 
that have the greatest relative influence on the decision can be identified.
In which of these two scenarios are you more willing to share your data? (19 questions remaining)
Figure 1.* An example question from the Medical and Mobility Data survey. The attributes were i) 
the UK COVID-19 Alert Level, ii) Data Type, iii) the organisation the data is being shared with, 
and vi) whether the data is identifiable or anonymous.
* The visual design of the question used in the study differs to the one shown here. Please refer to our WP3 snapshot 
report to view the actual design (https://www.omddac.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/WP3-Snapshot.pdf).
Scenario A Scenario B
and used to monitor if the current alert level, 
and its associated restrictions, is appropriate.
and used to monitor if the current alert level, 
and its associated restrictions, is appropriate.
We are in 
You are sharing 
with
Your data is 
We are in 
You are sharing 
with





























A company that has been hired to collect, store, 
and analyse data.
Provides policing services in your area.
Lowest tier of UK government. Provides public 
services, e.g. waste collection.
Aims to make the public healthier through
education and helping plan NHS services.
The data does not include your name or address.
Your name and address are included.
Virus is in circulation.
Some social distancing restrictions.
Extremely strict social distancing.
Risk of NHS services being overwhelmed.
Covid-19 no longer present in the UK.
No social distancing restrictions.
Health data gathered when using any NHS service.
Where you have been and when.
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A company that has been hired to collect,
store, and analyse data.
Provides policing services in your area.
Lowest tier of UK government. Provides
public services, e.g. waste collection.
Aims to make the public healthier through
education and helping plan NHS services.
Virus is in circulation.
Some social distancing restrictions.
Extremely strict social distancing.
Risk of NHS services being overwhelmed.
Covid-19 no longer present in the UK.
No social distancing restrictions.
Sample includes wastewater from approx.




Sample includes wastewater from approx.
1,000 people living on the same estate.
Sample includes wastewater from approx.
100,000 people living in the same town/city.
Sample includes wastewater from approx.






After selecting the data-sharing scenario that they preferred in the Choice-based Multiple Conjoint 
Analysis study design question, participants were then asked to rate how willing they would be to share 
their data in their preferred and I their non-preferred scenario along a Likert scale of 5 options, ranging 
from “Very unwilling” to “Very willing” (see figure 2).
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Figure 2.* Willingness Likert scale
Figure 3.* Example of a Medical Data, Data Detail Slider question.
The final question type was only used in the Medical and Mobility Data survey. We devised two six-point 
scales, one for medical data and one for mobility data (see figures 3 and 4). Each option on these scales 
was a different type of data, with their ordering reflecting different amounts of data detail they would 
be likely to contain, including a “No data” option. Participants were asked to choose what data, from 
the options along the scale, they would share with a particular organisation bearing in mind the i) UK 
COVID-19 Alert Level, and ii) whether the data was identifiable or anonymous.
Thinking about the scenario you chose, how willing are you to share your data?
Sharing Medical Data with your Local Authority



































1 2 3 4 5
Anonymised data
during Alert Level 3
Anonymised data
during Alert Level 5
Identifiable data
during Alert Level 1
Identifiable data
during Alert Level 3
Identifiable data
during Alert Level 5
* The visual design of the question used in the study differs to the one shown here. Please refer to our WP3 snapshot 
report to view the actual design (https://www.omddac.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/WP3-Snapshot.pdf).
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Figure 4.* Example of a Mobility Data, Data Detail Slider question.
Sharing Medical Data with your Local Authority
Anonymised data



















1 2 3 4 5
Anonymised data
during Alert Level 3
Anonymised data
during Alert Level 5
Identifiable data
during Alert Level 1
Identifiable data
during Alert Level 3
Identifiable data
during Alert Level 5
Agenda Day and Online Questionnaire: Incorporating the Perspectives of 
Young People 
To incorporate the perspectives of children and young people, OMDDAC worked with Investing in Children 
(‘IIC’), a children’s human rights organisation which works in partnership with children and young people 
to exercise their rights and participate in decisions that affect them. OMDDAC and IIC provided young 
people with an opportunity to express their views in two ways, by means of an agenda day or via an 
online questionnaire. An agenda day is an adult free meeting arranged by an IIC project worker and 
young facilitators to enable children and young people to meet and give their views on a particular issue. 
The agenda day took place virtually via Zoom on 6 July 2021. The online questionnaire was open from 23 
June until 16 July, advertised to young people already in contact with IIC and via their Twitter account. A 
series of questions and scenarios were drafted by OMDDAC and provided to IIC for discussion with the 
young people, asking what young people knew about how the Government is trying to tackle COVID-19, 
and in particular what they knew about the way information and technology was being used to tackle 
COVID-19. They were asked for their views on the use of wastewater testing, inter-agency information 
sharing about individuals who are self-isolating, and the use of algorithms to determine examination 
grades.  In total, 17 young people aged between eleven and eighteen provided their views, either at the 
agenda day or via the survey.  Whilst this is a small-scale study and findings cannot be considered in any 
way representative of young people’s views across England, it provides an important insight into the 
opinions and concerns of some young people.  
* The visual design of the question used in the study differs to the one shown here. Please refer to our WP3 snapshot 
report to view the actual design (https://www.omddac.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/WP3-Snapshot.pdf).

